This work is rooted on the analysis of growth and convergence at the regional level in Spain. Our contribution to that field is concentrated on the period 1980-2014, period characterized by a weak narrowing of the income per capita gap within regions. Several factors could explain that result. We focus our attention on the role of the political decentralization process in Spain, which actually began in the early eighties, on regional economic growth, a controversial and yet not enough studied issue. In Spain there are different models of decentralization, and even for each model, the different regions involved could follow different speeds gaining new administrative roles. Our econometric methodology is based on the system Generalized Method of Moments estimator. After using a general Mankiw-Romer-Weil approach, which fits well the Spanish data, our empirical work will implement other augmented growth regressions, which allow including a large set of explanatory variables. For such purpose, we try specifications with different proxies for the decentralization variable, as well as interactions with other variables that we think are linked to it, to capture the whole effect of decentralization. To sum up, our results, reinforced by several robustness exercises, are not conclusive on the relevance and sign of the effect of the decentralization path followed by the Spanish regions on growth and convergence, and points out to the importance of alternative factors. This result can contribute to the current debate in Spain on these topics. JEL codes: O47, R11, H11, C23.
Introduction
The approval of the Spanish Constitution (CE, henceforth) These CC.AA. are characterized by a very heterogeneous geographical dimension, population and income level. In this respect, we can highlight that there are two insular CC.AA.; seven CC.AA. are formed for just one province; Basque Country and Catalonia are in the group of wealthiest regions, fact that can be explained because they had an earlier industrialization, as well as Madrid, in better position being at the centre of the country. Other differential factors are the closeness to European countries, being on the coast or being an inland.
The decentralization process involved the transfer of competences from the central government to the CC.AA. Nevertheless, not all the CC.AA. have the same number of competences and the speed of this process of transfer of competences has also been different among them. We can distinguish three types of CC.AA.: the ones that used the article 143 of the CE, the ones that used the article 151 of the CE and the Foral Communities. The CC.AA.
of the article 143 of the CE 1 assumed a group of common competences at the beginning, such as the promotion of regional economic development, public works, housing, railways and roads, ports and airports, agriculture and fishing, environmental protection, tourism, economic regulation, culture and social welfare, but education and health were not yet their responsibility. Meanwhile, the CC.AA. of the article 151 of the CE 2 , thought for the historical nationalities, gained more competences sooner, as well did the foral 3 ones, which also had their own Fiscal and Economic Regime.
In this way, the main expenditure functions are distributed across the different levels of government. The central administration takes care basically of the foreign policy, defence, justice, social security, citizenship, immigration and unemployment benefits; and the CC.AA.
of health, education and culture, housing and social services. In the case of investment in public infrastructure, the responsibility is shared between both of them and the local government. As regards the promotion of economic activity, the CC.AA. have the exclusive responsibility, although the central government has a transversal power, as it sets the basis and coordinates the general planning of the economic activity 4 . In addition to that, since Spain joined the European Economic Community (nowadays European Union, EU) in 1986, the competence on certain matters, that belonged to the regional and/or member state levels, were transferred to the European institutions, which establish policies that limit the regional competences and forbid state aids to enterprises. Therefore, the economic policy is mainly developed at three levels: EU, state and CC.AA.
The decentralization process has advocates and opponents. The advocates argue the potential gains in efficiency in the provision of public goods by regional governments. In constrast, the main argument against fiscal federalism is that, unless it is combined with compensating subsidies, it will widen regional disparities, through a reduction of the redistribution of income among regions. Furthermore, when the revenues are decentralized, the wealthiest regions have more resources at their disposal than the least developed ones.
Another negative aspect highlighted by the opponents is that macroeconomic instability problems may emerge if a budgetary control is not properly exercized. The empirical evidence is however not unanimous.
In this paper we aim to make a contribution to this field of research, testing the convergence hypothesis and exploring the potential effect of the decentralization process on regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth in Spain since the setting of the State of the CC.AA. in 1980 until nowadays. We try to focus on the policy scope, that is, the range of policies for which a regional government is responsible. We use GDP per capita as a proxy for the living standard as this is the most used variable in empirical studies. Our econometric methodology is based on the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator technique. After using a general Mankiw-Romer-Weil (MRW, 1992) approach, which fits well the Spanish data, we implement other augmented growth regressions, which allow including a large set of explanatory variables, being the decentralization variable one of the additional regressors in the growth equation.
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the relationship between decentralization and economic growth. Section 3 takes a first look at the data and statistical sources, and explains the indicators used as proxies of decentralization.
Section 4 presents the econometric specification, the system GMM estimator for dynamic 4 Article 149.1.13a of the CE.
panels. In Section 5 the results from the empirical analysis are discussed. Finally, the last section concludes and summarizes the most relevant outcomes from our research.
Overview of the literature
The meaning of decentralization is not clear-cut and may vary. In general, it can be considered as a transfer of fiscal, political and policy competences to subnational governments. Hooghe et al. (2010) Many studies have tried to test the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth 6 , corresponding the early outstanding contributions to Oates (1985) , Rodríguez-Pose (1996) 7 and Davoodi and Zou (1998) . It has been studied for different groups of countries 8 , or focusing on just one country 9 . Authors like Woller and Phillips (1998), Thornton (2007) , Bodman (2011) and Baskaran and Feld (2013) do not find a significant relationship. On the contrary, the results in other studies, like Davoodi and Zou (1998 ), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003 , 2006 , Rodríguez-Pose and Kroijer (2009 ), Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011 ) and Gemmel et al. (2013 , point to a negative association between 5 Spain is one of the countries of the sample. 6 For a comprehensive and updated review of the impact of fiscal decentralization, see Breuss and Eller (2004) , Esteban et al. (2011 ), Martinez-Vazquez (2011 ), Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2015 or Baskaran et al. (2016) . 7 Results show that, at least in the early stages, the emergence of the Spanish regional state has had slightly beneficial effects on the relative growth performance of regions achieving the greatest level of autonomy in comparison with their growth rates in the high point of Spanish centralism (1985-1991 versus 1962-1969) . Nevertheless, it was still too early to assert whether this positive influence would be a long-lasting one or can be attributed mainly to the dynamics of institutional change and, thus, would be offset as time goes by. In this respect, Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004) , for a longer period , showed that no statistically significant association is evident for Spain between economic performance and devolution. 8 Among others, Woller and Phillips (1998), Yilmaz (1999) , Thießen (2005) , Thornton (2007) , Rodríguez-Pose and Kroijer (2009 ), Bodman (2011 ), Baskaran and Feld (2013 or Gemmell et al. (2013) . 9 A sample of these contributions is: for China, Zou (1998, 2001) , Jin et al. (2005) , Kanbur and Zhang (2005) , and Qiao et al. (2008) . For USA, Xie et al. (1999) , Akai et al. (2007) , and Akai and Hosio (2009) . For Germany, Stegarescu et al. (2002) . For Spain, Agúndez (2002) , Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004) , Esteban (2006) , Gil-Serrate and López-Laborda (2006) , Gil-Serrate (2007 ), Carrión-i-Silvestre et al. (2008 , Cantarero and Pérez (2009), and Gil-Serrate et al. (2011) . Finally, for Vietnam, Nguyen and Anwar (2011). fiscal decentralization and economic growth 10 . For just one country, Zou (1998, 2001 ), Stegarescu et al. (2002) and Kanbur and Zhang (2005) also seem to find a negative contribution. For the remaining international literature reviewed, in the majority of cases a positive impact has been found between decentralization and growth. For instance, Blöchliger and Égert (2013) , for OECD countries, conclude that decentralization, measured using revenue or expenditure shares, is positively associated with GDP per capita levels, although the effect seems to be stronger for revenue decentralization than for expenditure decentralization. Rodden (2004) also states that the decentralization of policy autonomy is rarely addressed by empirical scholars because it is difficult to measure, and in many cases it remains a shared responsibility between central and subcentral governments. Our work aims to cover this gap for the Spanish case. To get some insight into political decentralization we can also track regional and local elections over time. Recently there have been attempts to capture the multidimensional aspect of decentralization. For example, Schakel (2008) analyzes and compares the RAI developed by Marks et al. (2008) In the second part of our analysis, and this is perhaps our main contribution, we use several variables related to the competences assigned to the CC.AA., as they proxy the regional authority over policy making. The Ministry of Finance and Public Administration offers a list of the Royal Decrees of transfers of competences to the seventeen CC.AA., sorted by date, and a summary table. We have built three series from that information: 1) contains the total number of competences as they were assigned to each CC.AA. ( Figure 1 ) ; 2) cumulates those data over the period ( Finally, we have divided the 20 common competences in six areas: education (7 competences), health (3 competences), social services (2 competences), employment (4 competences), justice (1 competence) and productive sectors (3 competences). Each of these areas has a weight (30%, 45%, 10%, 3%, 2% and 10%, respectively), derived from the average amount of public expenditure in each field. Finally, we have weighted the cumulated common competences of each region, multiplying the number of competences assumed in each area by the corresponding weight ( Figure 6 ). 15 We could also have used the information of De la Fuente and Doménech (2015) . 16 The common competences to be considered are: occupational professional training, active employment policies, human and material resources of the administration of justice, religion teachers, teachers in penal institutions, management of the Spanish Agricultural Guarantee Fund, professional diving, nuclear facilities of 2nd and 3rd categories, implementation of legislation on pharmaceuticals, insurance intermediaries, vocational training for employment, student insurance, prison health care, labor and social security inspection, scholarships and study assistance, and standardization and validation of foreign academic qualifications in non-university higher education. For the last part of the study, we focus the analysis on the interaction of the CC Index with several explanatory variables. In particular, we consider the investment rate, the percentage of working age population with higher education, the average years of schooling, the rate of entrepreneurship, the Research and Development (R&D) expenditure (as percentage of GDP), and the informal economy (as percentage of GDP as well).
The rate of entrepreneurship is defined as the number of new companies created per ten thousand people, both series available from the INE. This is the same source used for the R&D expenditure (as percentage of GDP). Finally, the weight of the informal economy as percentage of GDP has been calculated on the basis of the data provided by Gómez-Antonio and Alañón (2004) and GESTHA-FURV (2014) .
Finally, we have also introduced two dummies: one that takes the value 1 if the CA used the article 151 of the CE or is foral, and therefore has a relative high degree of autonomy 18 ;
while the other dummy takes the value 1 if the CA used the article 143 of the CE, having a relative lower degree of autonomy 19 .
Econometric specification
The growth model to be estimated is based on well-known equations used empirically in this literature: the regressions à la Barro 20 . The main objective of Barro's regression equation is to remove from the error term certain variables additional to the initial GDP per capita that are considered determinants of the growth of the GDP per capita, and are correlated with the initial GDP per capita, fact that introduces a bias in the estimated coefficient for this variable (initial GDP per capita) 21 .
If the estimated parameters of the vector of these additional variables are significant, then the steady-state levels are different among the regions analyzed, demonstrating the existence of conditional beta convergence.
In particular, and following the specification proposed by Durlauf et al. (2005) , the growth equation to be estimated is the following 22 :
where y i,t is the GDP per capita growth in the period under study Barro (1991) . 21 See Sala-i-Martin (1994) . 22 We use a log-specification in all our equations, except for those variables expressed in percentage, so that the estimates are less sensible to outliers.
the classical determinants of the Solow (1956) and Mankiw et al. (1992) R&D expenditure, and informal economy, with our CC Index, to discover potential synergies among the set of regressors and how they actually affect the growth of GDP per capita 27 . In that case, with interactions, the equation to be estimated would be the following:
representing A and B the variables that interact, which can be from the vector X or Z.
Thus, for example, to calculate the marginal effect of variable A on GDP per capita growth, given that A belongs to vector Z, it would be necessary to differentiate equation (2) with respect to variable A:
23 Islam (1995) . 24 For example, Bonneford (2014) . 25 Among others, Islam (1995) , Caselli et al. (1996) and Bond et al. (2001) . 26 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010 and 2011-2014 (this last average is for four years, since there is no further information). 27 For a more detailed description of the specification of interaction models, see Friedrich (1982) , Braumoeller (2004) or Brambor et al. (2006) . We will focus our attention on the system GMM estimator 29 .
Econometric methods such as Ordinary Least Squares ( To solve these problems of omitted variable bias, endogeneity and measurement errors, Caselli et al. (1996) proposed to implement the difference GMM estimators to panel data 32 .
However, in a next step, Bond et al. (2001) proved that, when the time series are persistent, as 28 The value of B that makes zero the marginal effect would be -π/ρ. In case variable B had integer values, it would be possible to plot the marginal effects of A as a function of B, as we will present in the next section. In this case, for interpretation purposes, as Brambor et al. (2006) point out, the standard error relative to the marginal effect must be calculated. This is calculated from the estimated coefficients and according to the following formula used in Aiken and West (1991) : 
29 See Blundell et al. (2001) and Roodman (2009a) for thorough reviews of GMM methodology. We consider the one-step option, lag (2, 3) and small sample correction. We have used Stata and the command xtabond2 developed by Roodman (2009a) . Robustness checks have also been implemented, considering alternative specifications of GMM system, which can be provided by the authors upon request. 30 See Nickell (1981) and Hsiao (1986) . 31 Due to these reasons, we have also estimated all the equations using OLS and fixed effects for dynamic panel data, so we could have a benchmarking framework. These alternative estimates can be provided by the authors upon request. 32 An adaptation of the method described by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano y Bond (1991) .
is the case of GDP per capita, and the number of time observations is small, the firstdifferenced GMM estimator may perform poorly, since lagged levels of the series only provide weak instruments for subsequent first-differences. They proposed to use the system GMM estimator instead, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , which allows a better extraction of the information from the time series. This estimator uses an additional assumption about the initial conditions (the first differences of the instrumental variables are not correlated with the fixed effects), to obtain moment conditions that provide valid information even for series that are persistent. For this reason, Bond et al. (2001) recommended this system GMM estimator for empirical growth research.
Following this advice, that will be the estimation procedure used in the present study.
The procedure of the system GMM consists in the estimation of a system of equations in both first-differences and levels, where the instruments used in the level equations are lagged first-differences of the series, and the instruments used in the first-difference equations are the lagged levels of the regressors.
The consistency of the system GMM estimator depends on two conditions: the absence of serial correlation of second order in the first-differenced error term and the validity of the instruments, which should not be correlated with the error term. To test the first condition the Arellano-Bond test is used, which examines the correlations of first and second order in the first-differenced equation residuals. By definition, there is always first-order correlation, due to the fact of applying first differences to the specification, otherwise it would indicate that there are no dynamic effects, and the system GMM estimator would not be therefore suitable.
On the other hand, to test the validity of the instruments, the Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) tests are used. The Hansen test confirms the validity of the instruments in levels and the Sargan test the validity of the new instruments in differences for the level equation added by the system GMM.
Roodman (2009b) demostrated that using too many instruments could bias the results of system GMM estimation. He pointed out that although there is no a consensus in the empirical literature about which is the maximum number of instruments that should be used, the usual practice is to have less instruments than individuals. In our paper, as the number of individuals is small (17), there is a potential problem of instrument profileration, as pointed out in Bowsher (2002) Another problem that can arise of the estimation is the existence of cross-sectional error dependence. To take account of this, time dummies have been introduced in the estimation, as they capture common trends in the dependent variable and reduce the asymptotic bias of the estimator in presence of that kind of error.
Results
In the next subsections we will present the main conclusions derived from the estimations. In the first one, the estimation includes the classical variables of Mankiw et al. (1992) : the initial GDP per capita, the population growth, the investment rate and the percentage of working age population with higher education; plus additional control variables: the share of agricultural employment and the unemployment rate. In the second subsection, the different proxies considered for the competences of the Spanish regions are introduced in the estimation. Finally, the marginal effects of potential relevant variables for the growth of GDP per capita, estimated attending to the different degree of autonomy of the regions, are shown in the third subsection 35 . In general, the results seem to confirm the existence of conditional beta convergence among Spanish regions during the last three and a half decades, although at a low pace.
The Mankiw-Romer-Weil approach
In Table 1 we show the results of the estimation according to Mankiw et al. (1992) (column 1), over seven five-year average periods . We regress the growth of GDP per capita, conditioned to the initial GDP per capita, population growth (plus the rate of technical progress and the rate of depreciation of physical and human capital), non-residential investment rate as percentage of GDP, and the rate of working age population with higher education. The negative and statistically significant sign associated with the initial GDP per capita confirms the existence of conditional beta convergence among Spanish regions.
33 Accordingly, we have used this option. The results for lag (2,3) are analyzed in the next section. 34 Soto (2009) analyzes OLS, fixed effects, difference GMM, level GMM and system GMM, one and two-step. 35 In relation to the tests, the Arellano-Bond tests indicate the presence of a negative first-order autocorrelation in the different specifications used, while we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation of order 2 in each of the estimations. Regarding the Sargan and Hansen tests, the results should be taken with caution when the p-values are around one, circumstance that could happen due to the fact that the number of sections in the sample is small, and the number of instruments used is high. 
Note:
The dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth. Variables are five-year averages during the period 1980-2014. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the results include time dummies, not reproduced for space reasons. System GMM estimator, option one-step, with all explanatory variables being treated as potentially endogenous. Time dummies are considered predetermined. Small sample correction and lag (2, 3) is applied, with xtabond2 package for Stata (Roodman, 2009a) .
For the rest of the variables, as the Solow model predicts, population growth has a negative and statistically significant impact on GDP per capita growth, while the percentage of working age population with higher education has a positive and statistically significant effect. In the case of the investment rate, the estimated coefficient has a positive sign, although of smaller magnitude than the related to human capital, and it is not statistically significant. Finally, the control variables 36 introduced, the rate of agricultural employment and the unemployment rate, have the expected negative signs, although only the first one is statistically significant. These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, those regions with higher 36 They try to capture structural differences among the Spanish regions.
ratio of workers employed in the primary sector and higher unemployment rate experienced lower GDP per capita growth than the rest. So, in short, we could point out that human capital appears to be a key determinant for growth, and could be considered a factor that enables the process of catching up among Spanish regions.
We also check if the analysis of conditional convergence varies if we consider the degree of regional autonomy (column 2). For such purpose, the same estimation is implemented decomposing the initial GDP per capita into two variables. The first variable, initial GDP per capita for regions with higher degree of autonomy, is obtained by multiplying the initial level of income by a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the region accessed autonomy using the article 151 of the CE or it is a foral region, and 0 otherwise. The second variable, GDP per capita for regions with lower degree of autonomy, is obtained by multiplying the initial GDP per capita by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the region accessed autonomy using the article 143 of the CE, and 0 otherwise. These results also confirm the existence of conditional beta convergence, with significant and similar coefficients, that last fact checked by the test of equality of coefficients. The results for the rest of the variables follow the patterns aforementioned.
Effects of the degree of regional autonomy
The estimation obtained in the first subsection constitutes our benchmark. In the present subsection we will progressively introduce what we have considered as proxy variables for the degree of regional autonomy, so we can assess the effect of the number of transferred competences on GDP per capita growth.
The results of Table 2 show a positive, though not statistically significant, relationship between the total number of competences assumed by Spanish regions and GDP per capita growth (column 1). When we consider either the total number of competences (column 2) or the common competences (column 4), both in cumulative terms, the coefficient is equal to zero, pointing out that neither of these variables explains GDP per capita growth.
In the case of cumulated total competences versus the regional average (column 3), a positive but not significant impact arises, which could suggest that if a region has a higher degree of autonomy than the average, it would grow at a relative higher pace than the rest.
In column 5 we introduce in the estimation the CC Index. Again, the impact would be positive, but not statistically significant. Finally, in column 6, we work with weighted cumulated common competences, obtaining the same result, a positive effect on GDP per capita growth, but not statistically significant. In these two cases, the coefficient associated to initial GDP per capita decreases, in comparison with our benchmark estimation, when the decentralization variable is taken into account, which could point out that both variables had a positive contribution to the process of catching-up among Spanish regions.
Marginal effects of explanatory variables, according to the Common Competences Index
The Spanish regions have competences on supply-side policies, such as public investment, education, entrepreneurship, or research, development and innovation. Thus, it is interesting to analyze the direct effect of these variables on GDP per capita growth, and their marginal effect, when we consider the different degree of regional autonomy, measured by the CC Index. This could shed light on the achievements of regional policy on variables of its influence.
In column 1, an interaction between the CC Index and the investment rate is introduced. In this case, the coefficients for both variables become negative, with the interaction term positive but not statistically significant. Figure 7 represents the values of the marginal effects according to the CC Index. The marginal effect of the investment rate is slightly above zero for regions with low CC Index, increasing the positive effect as the CC Index raises. It could suggest that having more competences has a positive effect on investment and its impact on growth. 
CC Index

Marginal effect
In the case of education, we have used the percentage of working age population with higher education (column 2) and the average years of schooling (column 4). For the first one, it does not seem to have a complementarity, being the coefficient of the interaction positive but nearly zero (Figure 8 ). The effect does not vary considering more or less autonomy. On the other hand, when the average years of schooling are used, the interaction is positive, though not statistically significant, and the marginal effect is almost zero regardless the value of the CC Index (Figure 9 ). According to this, regional education policy does not seem to have a differential impact in regions with higher or lower number of competences, while human capital bears a positive impact on GDP per capita growth.
Another relevant determinant of GDP per capita is entrepreneurship, as can be seen in column 5 of appears that a higher degree of decentralization fosters the positive effect of the R&D expenditure ( Figure 11 ).
One possible extension that can be considered, due to its relative importance in the Spanish economy, is the impact of the informal economy and its potential interaction with the level of regional autonomy. A positive relationship between the level of informal economy and GDP per capita growth is found (column 9), which can be explained for the fact that the informal economy accounts, in average, for nearly a quarter of Spanish GDP, generating several possible connections with the rest of the economy. Nevertheless, when we consider the interaction with the CC Index, it appears to be negative, so that when the decentralization reaches it maximum level, the marginal effect of the informal economy becomes negative ( Figure 12 ). In contrast, when the CC Index takes value 1, the marginal effect remains positive. So it seems that having more regional autonomy could discourage the informal economy, in the sense that it would not have a positive impact on GDP per capita growth.
Finally, we have decomposed the CC Index into two variables, one that contains regions with higher degree of autonomy, and the rest (columns 11 and 12). As we expected, the complementarity is positive in the case of regions which accessed sooner to a higher level of competences, while it is negative for the rest of the regions. In any case, neither of the coefficients is statistically significant.
Conclusions
In this work the objective has been to analyze, on the basis of a growth equation as proposed by Barro (1991) , and using the Mankiw et al. (1992) model as a benchmark, the convergence and growth process followed by the Spanish CC.AA. since the beginning of the decentralization process in the early eighties of the last century. For such purpose, a dynamic panel data has been used, applying the system GMM estimator.
In the benchmank specification, which corresponds to the regression of GDP per capita growth conditioned to the initial level of GDP per capita, population growth, the nonresidential investment rate as percentage of GDP, the rate of working age population with higher education, and the control variables (rate of agricultural employment and unemployment rate), a statistically significant and negative sign is obtained for the initial GDP per capita level. That would confirm the existence of a process of catching-up among Spanish regions. Population growth has the expected negative effect, as the Solow model predicts, while human capital fosters growth. In the case of the investment rate, the estimated coefficient is positive, though it is not statistically significant. Finally, both control variables present negative coefficients, which suggests that having a high proportion of employment in the primary sector and a high unemployment rate is a drag on growth. Therefore, the empirical evidence for Spanish regions confirms the expected results, and we also obtain a positive contribution of innovation and entrepreneurship, key elements for regional policymakers.
For the sake of robustness, the process of transfer of competences has been proxied by several indicators that take into account the total number of competences assumed by regional governments, or just the competences that are considered common. In particular, we have built a CC Index that ranges between 1 and 5, trying to measure the degree of autonomy of a region. In general, it seems that the capacity of a region to implement policies has a positive contribution to GDP per capita growth, although the results are not statistically significant.
Further extensions of that index considering a wider definition of decentralization would need to be investigated.
In the final part of the research we have tried to shed light on the achievement of regional policy, paying attention to some variables of its influence. For such purpose, we have selected four areas: public investment, education, entrepreneurship, and research, development and innovation. We have analyzed the direct effect of these variables on GDP per capita growth, and their marginal effect, when we consider the different degree of regional autonomy, measured by the CC Index. In general, it seems that a higher number of competences involves a stronger positive effect of the indicators on GDP per capita growth, with the exception of entrepreneurship, whose positive effect would fade and even becomes neutral, but just when the CC Index takes the upper value.
Another possible extension that we have considered interesting, due to its relative importance in the Spanish economy, is the impact of the informal economy and its potential interaction with the level of regional autonomy. A positive relationship between the level of informal economy and GDP per capita growth is found. Nevertheless, when we consider the interaction with the CC Index, it appears to be negative, so that when the decentralization reaches it maximum level, the marginal effect of the informal economy becomes negative.
Finally, when we decompose the CC Index into two variables, one that contains the regions with higher degree of autonomy, and the rest, as expected, we obtain a positive complementarity in the case of the regions which accessed sooner to a higher level of competences, while it is negative for the rest. In any case, neither of the coefficients is statistically significant.
We think that our research has robustly confirmed some results known in this literature as well as shed light on some less prolific fields, as decentralization from an administrative and political point of view. Our analysis invites to deepen the investigation of these uncovered relationships between regional growth and the process of transfer of competences, using alternative data and methods, for example, introducing spatial econometrics. All of this, with the objective of testing with high scientific rigor the hypotheses that we have in mind.
The renewed and never forgotten interest in the analysis of regional growth and convergence, deserves deepening in this type of analysis, from all possible perspectives.
